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Ethics of the Attorney in
Medical Malpractice Litigation
In medical malpractice litigation,
providing legal representation to older
patients or their healthcare providers
carries significant ethical implications.
However, there has been little scholarly
or practical discussion of legal ethics
concerning circumstances in which the
medical malpractice plaintiff is an
older person. The author sets forth a
tentative outline of key issues that
should be included in an analysis of
legal ethics in the medical malpractice
context, particularly when an older
patient is involved.
By Marshall B. Kapp
Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M.P.H., EC.L.M., is Professor
and Director of the Office of Geriatric Medicine &
Gerontology at Wright State University School of
Medicine, Dayton, Ohio. He is also a member of the
adjunct faculty at the University of Dayton School of
Law.
ithough periodic public-policy reform
<Y efforts attempt to change, either fun-
damentally or incrementally, the way
in which specific patients' allegations
of substandard, injurious medical
treatment get resolved,' medical malpractice tort liti-
gation is likely to remain an important component
of the legal system in the United States for the fore-
seeable future.2 The problems of medical malpractice
and how the legal system deals with it are matters of
substantial concern to older Americans and the phy-
sicians and other healthcare professionals who care
for them.
Older persons are at disproportionately high risk
for suffering harm as a result of medical errors, in
terms of both incidence of errors and severity of in-
juries.3 In fact, one major study of iatrogenic injuries
found that patients sixty-five years of age and older
accounted for twenty-seven percent of the hospital-
ized population, but forty-three percent of all
error-related adverse events. 4 Although the number
of older persons as medical malpractice plaintiffs has
been disproportionately low in the past, that is be-
ginning to change.
Providing legal representation to either patients
(including older persons) who feel aggrieved by medi-
cal malpractice or healthcare professionals who are
accused of professional negligence' carries significant
ethical implications. Nevertheless, there is very little
discussion in existing ethical codes or the published
medical-legal literature-let alone in accessible
gerontological sources-focusing precisely on the
ethical considerations potentially pertaining to at-
torneys who represent plaintiffs or defendants in the
context of medical malpractice litigation. There is
an abundance of general materials regarding the eth-
ics of litigation, including personal-injury cases;
however, it is rare to find scholarly or practical
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discussion of legal ethics concerning circumstances
in which the medical malpractice plaintiff is an older
person.
This article by no means purports to comprehen-
sively fill this troubling void. Rather, I try here simply
to identify and set forth a tentative outline of some of
the major issues that ought to be included in an ad-
equate analysis of legal ethics in the medical malpractice
context, especially when an older patient is involved.
The detailed work of that analysis must await the at-
tention of subsequent commentators.
Specific Issues for Counsel on Either Side
For medical malpractice cases that proceed through
the adversarial tort system, it ordinarily is impera-
tive for both plaintiff and defendant to purchase the
services of expert witnesses. Ethical considerations
may arise if an attorney for either side in the litiga-
tion attempts to compensate an expert on a
contingency-fee basis-that is, agreeing to pay the
expert an amount that varies depending on the out-
come of the lawsuit. Because such arrangements may
directly influence (and certainly present the appear-
ance of directly influencing) the content and
decisiveness of an expert's stated opinion, they are
generally considered inappropriate.6
On a more basic level, to what extent do legal
advocates in malpractice litigation have an ethical
obligation to promote objectively preferable alter-
natives to the traditional ritual of "hired gun"
adversary expert witnesses squaring off in a swear-
ing contest? For example, legal advocates might have
experts hired and paid by the court itself, and en-
courage courts to give more weight to clinical-
practice guidelines or parameters7 that have been
developed through an extra-legal process of profes-
sional consensus.
A second set of ethical questions pertaining to
counsel for either party in malpractice litigation re-
volves around implications of the availability of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms.'
To what extent does an attorney have an ethical (and
potential legal) duty to inform the client about the
availability of ADR?9 Especially when an older plain-
tiff for whom time is especially of the essence is
involved, would the attorney's obligation go beyond
just informing the client to affirmatively recommend-
ing that the ADR option(s) be pursued? If so, how
vigorous must or should that recommendation be?
May the defense attorney refuse to submit to ADR
(which would presumably resolve the dispute more
expeditiously), in order to use the usual slow pace
of civil litigation in the courts to disadvantage an
older plaintiff?
During the lengthy pretrial stages of medical
malpractice litigation, several opportunities ordi-
narily arise for settlement of the claim (and indeed
most malpractice claims are settled prior to trial).
Ethical questions arise if an attorney fails to pursue
settlement when available terms would be beneficial
to the client, but the attorney's personal financial
interests would profit from prolonging the litigation.
Either attorney in medical malpractice litigation
may have the chance, at deposition and/or trial, to
cross-examine a present or former client from an-
other case who is serving as an expert witness in the
instant lawsuit. To what extent, if any, may the at-
torney utilize in cross-examination information
obtained from the expert witness in a different con-
text, which was predicated on a fiduciary or trust
relationship? Such opportunities confront the cross-
examining attorney with difficult ethical conundrums
concerning tension between respect for confidenti-
ality and loyalty within the attorney/client
relationship, on one hand, and the attorney's respon-
sibility to zealously advocate for each client, on the
other.' °
Finally, all members of the bar arguably have a
general ethical obligation to work toward improv-
ing the fairness and efficiency of the overall system
for resolving medical malpractice claims nationally
and within particular jurisdictions. The current tort
system often serves older patients especially ineffec-
tively. The duty to promote systemic reform, however,
may run contrary to both plaintiffs' and defense at-
torneys' personal stake in maintaining a
long-standing system that has been very lucrative for
them and for a small subset of their clients. There-
fore, we must ask about the extent to which that
real, tangible factor is a legitimate counterbalance
to the attorney's more amorphous responsibility to
serve the public good.
Specific Issues for Plaintiff's Counsel
Successfully prosecuting a medical malpractice claim,
particularly one involving geriatric issues, requires a
specific blend of knowledge, experience, and skill.
Thus, the threshold ethical issue is whether the at-
torney who is approached to evaluate a potential case
and represent the injured patient possesses adequate
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relevant competence to properly fulfill the necessary
responsibilities. The ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct provide in Rule 1.1, "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Com-
petent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably nec-
essary for the representation." An attorney who takes
on client representation without sufficient compe-
tence may be held legally liable for professional
malpractice.11
If an attorney refers a person with a potential
claim to a different attorney, may the referring at-
torney accept or even demand a referral fee? What
are the ethical parameters when the original attor-
ney takes on co-counsel? ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(e) provides:
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the
same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or, by written agree-
ment with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to
the participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Advertisements for potential clients by law firms
representing plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions
are ubiquitous today. Attorney advertising, while
protected by the First Amendment,1 2 raises a host
of ethical concerns regarding (among other things)
taste, impact on public perceptions of attorneys
and the legal system, and influence on the quality of
care provided by anxious, intimidated healthcare
professionals) 3
One of the most controversial aspects of repre-
senting plaintiffs in medical malpractice litigation is
the practice of compensating the attorney according
to a contingency-fee agreement under which, typi-
cally, the attorney is paid a preset percentage of the
plaintiff's eventual financial recovery if, but only if,
there is a financial recovery. The ongoing debate over
this practice is by now quite familiar: the dangers of
incentivizing the plaintiff's attorney to elevate win-
ning (and for the maximum amount) above all other
values, versus the need for non-wealthy injured pa-
tients (and many older individuals fall within this
category) to have an effective "key to the courthouse"
to vindicate their rights. 14
According to the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Rule 1.5 Fees:
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter for which the service is rendered, except in [do-
mestic relations matters or criminal defense]. A
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall
state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall ac-
crue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial, or
appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted
from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to
be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calcu-
lated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the
lawyer shall provide the client with a written state-
ment stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is
a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and
the method of its determination.
The method of attorney compensation in medi-
cal malpractice cases (i.e., the contingency-fee system)
is a distinct ethical issue from that of the reasonable-
ness of professional fees. Regarding the latter, ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5 Fees
states:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a
fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal services properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional rela-
tionship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
An attorney evaluating the validity of a poten-
tial client's case may be overly inclined to file a lawsuit
on the client's behalf due to fear of being sued him-
self/herself (in the case of older clients, usually by
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disgruntled family members) for legal malpractice
for failure to pursue the claim. When the attorney
takes such defensive action (despite his/her best judg-
ment that the claim lacks merit) and fully expects
that it will be withdrawn or dismissed eventually,
the trouble, expense, and emotional turmoil caused
to the defendant(s) and the demands placed by the
claim on the administrators of the legal system raise
significant ethical concerns. Related concerns also
are implicated when a plaintiff's attorney demands
punitive or exemplary damages in the complaint,S
not because the attorney anticipates being able to
establish an evidentiary basis for such damages but
strictly as a tactical maneuver to gain the admission
into the record of evidence relating to the defendants'
financial well-being that might subconsciously sway
the jury to award higher compensatory damages than
it otherwise would have awarded. Similarly, we may
question the ethical acceptability of the common tac-
tic of naming in a malpractice complaint multiple
defendants when the plaintiff's attorney, from the
time of inception of the lawsuit, expects to later dis-
miss some of those defendants.
Prior to formally commencing litigation, an at-
torney representing the patient may seek to meet and
discuss the medical care in question with the patient's
treating physician. Ethical conflicts arise when such
a meeting is sought, and certainly if it takes place,
without the attorney explicitly informing the physi-
cian that he/she may be a possible defendant in a
malpractice lawsuit to be brought by that attorney
on the patient's behalf. 16
Finally, to what extent, if any, should a plaintiff's
medical malpractice attorney balance the traditional
duty of fidelity and zealous advocacy owed to the
individual client against the potential adverse rami-
fications of malpractice litigation for the larger
society? For instance, should the attorney take into
account the fact that collecting a large monetary judg-
ment for a single client in a particular case might
threaten the continued viability of certain healthcare
facilities or services in the plaintiff's community?
There is, for example, substantial evidence that ag-
gressive litigation prosecuted over the past few years
against nursing homes in Florida has had the proxi-
mate effect of making liability insurance for nursing
homes so expensive in that state that a number of
facilities are closing and that the availability of nurs-
ing home beds for individuals who need them has
been severely compromised. 17 Conversely, is such an
impact merely, as plaintiffs' attorneys contend, some-
one else's problem? Should plaintiffs' attorneys
consider the ways in which large legal judgments are
likely to encourage negative defensive medical prac-
tices by providers (e.g., excessive testing and
interventions or avoidance of difficult patients), not
only for the specific defendants in the litigated
case but for other healthcare professionals who
largely form their perceptions of legal risk through
media coverage of malpractice litigation?"8 Is the
harm to future patients stemming from such nega-
tive defensive provider practices irrelevant to the
litigator whose actions at least partially inspire those
practices?
Specific Issues for Defense Counsel
Perhaps the most pressing ethical challenge facing
defense counsel in medical malpractice litigation re-
volves around identifying the locus of the attorney's
duty of loyalty (i.e., identifying who the client is)19
when there is a real or apparent conflict between the
interests of the insurer and the defendant medical-
care provider. The conflict may be exacerbated by
the provider's apprehension of being reported by the
insurer to the National Practitioner Data Bank as
mandated by the federal Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act. 20  For example, may the defense
attorney, on the basis of the insurer's financial inter-
ests, ethically settle a claim over a defendant
provider's objection if the insurance contract so
permits ?21
Second, multiple defendants (e.g., attending
physician, facility/agency Medical Director, Direc-
tor of Nursing, facility/agency) are routinely named
in medical malpractice complaints. Consequently,
questions may arise regarding the propriety of the
same attorney representing more than one provider
in a lawsuit when the defendants share a common
liability insurer-and hence unitary legal represen-
tation may be cost-effective-but who otherwise may
not have identical interests in the litigation (e.g., when
the different defendants are accusing one another of
negligent patient care). ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest
instructs:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the repre-
sentation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
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tion will not adversely affect the relationship with
the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the repre-
sentation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single mat-
ter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks in-
volved.
A defense attorney is placed in an ethical bind
when he/she discovers, through revelation directly
from the client or other, independent sources of in-
formation, that the provider being defended has
falsified medical records that ordinarily would be
placed into evidence by either the plaintiff or defen-
dant. Existing formal statements of ethical principles,
here as elsewhere, are exceedingly vague. ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3 announces:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a tribunal...
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures.
The Rule is silent on the specifics of "reasonable re-
medial measures."
Another ethical bind for the defense attorney
arises when an insurer who retained the attorney to
defend one of its insured physicians (Physician #1)
threatens to cancel the liability insurance policy of
other physicians whom it insures (Physicians #2 and
#3) if Physicians #2 and #3 testify as expert witnesses
in a case against Physician #1. Such coercive, truth-
suppressive conduct by the insurer is ethically
dubious and defense counsel should actively resist
participating in it.22
Conclusion
Older patients who suffer serious iatrogenic injuries
through the fault of healthcare providers, as well as
those patients' families, need effective and efficient
processes for vindicating their legal rights and at-
tending to their needs. For the foreseeable future,
attorneys will be central actors in all facets of what-
ever process(es) we perpetuate or develop to
accomplish this objective.
Useful guidance for identifying and responding
to the ethical challenges confronting legal counsel in
this specific sphere is surprisingly sparse. This ar-
ticle, by outlining some of the more salient issues,
aims to contribute to a needed discussion of those
ethical challenges.
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